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Abstract: The debate on the protection of consumers in cross-border settings has flared up re-
peatedly since the introduction of the consumer protection rules of the Brussels I and Rome I Regu-
lations. Whilst in the past consumer protection had not often been prioritised and the CJEU had in-
sisted on strict interpretations to the consumers’ detriment,1 and though since then a middle road 
between the interests of the entrepreneur and the consumer has been sought,2 it seems that the 
pendulum has now swung back the other way again. According to the CJEU’s latest judgment in  
C-218/12 Emrek/Sabranovic, in all cases where an entrepreneur concludes a contract with a for-
eign consumer, this falls under the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the consumer’s domicile, even if the
entrepreneur’s marketing activity in the consumer’s state was not causally relevant for the eventu-
al conclusion of the contract.
Keywords: Conflict of Laws; International Procedure; Adjudicary Jurisdiction; Consumer Law; 
Cross-border Consumer Contracts. 
I. Introduction
When it comes to consumer claims against entrepreneurs, international jurisdiction is determined 
in the European context by the Brussels I Regulation.3 This Regulation provides for an adjudicatory 
jurisdiction, supplementing the general jurisdiction of the defendant entrepreneur’s habitual domi-
cile (Article 4 Brussels I Regulation). As well as the State where the obligation in question was to be 
performed – which usually coincides with the defendant’s domicile (Article 7.1 (a) Brussels I Regula-
tion) – the State where the consumer is domiciled also has jurisdiction insofar as the entrepreneur 
* Dr. iur., Dipl.-Jur., LL.B., LL.M., Institute for European Tort Law, Austrian Academy of Sciences and University of
Graz; Centre for European Private Law, University of Graz. 
** PD Dr. iur., Department of European, International and Comparative Law, University of Vienna. 
The authors wish to express their sincere thanks to Andrew Bell, University of Birmingham, UK, for providing his 
excellent linguistic expertise as well as to an anonymous reviewer for revealing crucial issues to be addressed. 
1 For instance, CJEU 20. 1. 2005, C-464/01, Johann Gruber/BayWa AG. 
2 For instance, CJEU 7. 12. 2010, C-585/08, C-144/09, Pammer/Reederei Schlüter and Alpenhof/Heller; cf Gillies, Clari-
fying the ‘Philosophy of Article 15’ in the Brussels I Regulation: C-585/08 Peter Pammer v Reedere Karl Schluter 
GmbH & Co and C-144/09 Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH & Co KG v Oliver Heller, ICLQ 2011, 557 (557 et seq). 
3 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdic-
tion and the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2012 L 351/1. 
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directs his or her commercial activity to that State and the contract falls within the scope of the 
activity (Article 17.1 (c) in connection with Article 18 Brussels I Regulation). Such specific rules also 
exist in the provisions on the applicable law for consumer contracts laid down in Article 6 Rome I 
Regulation. According to recitals 7 and 24 of that regulation, they must be understood as con-
sistent with Article 17 Brussels I Regulation. 
In light of the continuing growth in online commerce and the ubiquitous web presence of entre-
preneurs, the debate has centred on the phrase ‘directed […] to’ the State where the consumer is 
domiciled in relation to their commercial or professional activity.4 The question arose whether an 
online presence was sufficient to satisfy this criterion and establish the competence of the courts 
in the State where the consumer was domiciled. As is well known, the CJEU handed down a 
landmark decision on this issue in the joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, Pammer/Reederei 
Schlüter and Alpenhof/Heller,5 referred by the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof, 
OGH) for preliminary rulings.6 The court did not formulate any abstract definition of the legal 
phrase ‘directed to’, but instead provided a list of indicia it considered suitable to determine how 
the activity in question is ‘directed’. It remains to be seen whether the CJEU did itself any favours 
by proceeding in this way – we must expect that there will be ever more applications for prelimi-
nary rulings looking for resolutions in individual cases. This aspect will not, however, be exam-
ined in any more detail here.7  
Nonetheless, it is striking that, while the CJEU went into depth on indicia for how the entrepreneur 
‘directed’ the activity in question, it did not pay any attention to the subsequent event – the con-
sumer’s conclusion of the contract.8 In contrast with this, Germanic supreme courts9 have always 
required that the consumer show this internal link as a restrictive criterion; the activity (directed to 
the consumer’s State) must have been the cause of the actual conclusion of the contract.  
It may be assumed that the causal link between the marketing activity and the conclusion of the 
contract is only very rarely at issue in practice. The consumer, who bears the burden of proof in 
cases brought outside of the defendant’s domicile (Article 4 Brussels I Regulation), will usually 
submit that he took notice, first, of the entrepreneur’s marketing activity directed at his State 
(typically the entrepreneur’s online presence) and, second, of the entrepreneur himself. He will 
claim that in consequence he concluded the contract because of the marketing activity. This is 
not the position adopted in Luxembourg, however, as C-218/12 Emrek/Sabranovic10 illustrates. 
                                                
4 See e.g. Øren, International Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts in e-Europe, ICLQ 2003, 665 (665 et seq).  
5 CJEU 7. 12. 2010, C-585/08, C-144/09, Pammer/Reederei Schlüter und Alpenhof/Heller. 
6 OGH 6 Ob 192/08s ecolex 2009/114; OGH 6 Ob 24/09m ecolex 2009/300. 
7 This is not a tenable objection to a flexible system in the present authors’ opinion, cf Thiede, A Topless Duchess 
and Caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed. A Flexible Conflict of Laws Rule for Crossborder Infringements of 
Privacy and Reputation, in Bonomi/Romano (eds), Yearbook of Private International Law 2012/2013 (2013) 247 
(247 et seqq); Symeonides, Codification and Flexibility in Private International Law, in Brown/Snyder (eds), General 
Reports of the XVIIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (2011) 167 (167 et seq); with a 
different view Aubry/Poillot/Sauphanor-Brouillaud, Panorama de droit de la consummation 2013, Recueil Dalloz 
2013, 945 (974); d’Avout, JCP G 2011, 226; Mankowski, Autoritatives zum „Ausrichten“ unternehmerischer Tätigkeit 
unter Art. 15 Abs. 1 lit. c EuGVVO, IPRax 2012, 144. 
8 In the Pammer/Reederei Schlüter and Alpenhof/Heller case this was perhaps understandable because there was an 
undeniable causal link between the direction of the activity and the conclusion of the contract. 
9 See OGH 2 Ob 256/08y EvBl 2009/136 (Clavora); BGH III ZR 71/08 CR 2009, 174 = EuZW 2009, 26 (Leible/Müller) = 
IPRax 2009, 258 (Mankowski 238) = NJW 2009, 298; OLG Köln 12 U 49/09 NZM 2010, 495; OLG Karlsruhe IPRax 
2008, 348 = NJW 2008, 45 = AnwBl 2008, 380; OLG Schleswig WM 1997, 991 = RIW 1997, 955; OLG Karlsruhe 14 U 
72/06 IPRax 2008, 348 (Mankowski 333) = IPRspr 2007/145 = NJW 2008, 85. 
10 CJEU 17. 10. 2013, C-218/12, Lokman Emrek/Vlado Sabranovic (not published). 
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There it was clear that the contact between the defendant entrepreneur and the claimant consum-
er could not be traced back to the entrepreneur’s website. The CJEU decided that Article 17 Brus-
sels I Regulation did not require a causal link between the means employed to direct the activity at 
the consumer’s state (such as a website) and the conclusion of the contract with that consumer. 
In the following sections, the facts of the case (II) and the arguments of the CJEU (III) will be sum-
marised, and the decision discussed with regard to its doctrinal justification (IV) and its underly-
ing policy (V). It will be argued that, from a doctrinal perspective, the arguments raised by the 
CJEU are highly questionable and methodologically weak. Similarly, from a consumer protection 
perspective they reflect a trend of developments based on the use of law as a means to encour-
age certain consumer conduct, rather than as a means to balance unequal bargaining power. 
II. Facts 
The dispute in Emrek/Sabranovic arose from the following facts. A German consumer bought a car 
in France. It was possible to prove that the communication between the entrepreneur and the 
consumer was not linked to the entrepreneur’s website, but instead to a recommendation given 
by an acquaintance of the claimant. The claimant only discovered the defendant’s website after 
the contract was concluded, but he then tried to rely on it in order to establish that his domicile 
state had jurisdiction under Article 17.1 (c) Brussels I Regulation. Given the design of the website, 
there was no doubt that it was directed at foreign clients in the sense of the relevant rule. As the 
website had in no way provided the motive for the consumer to conclude the contract, however, 
and given that the consumer had travelled abroad on his own initiative and only learned of the 
website after the contract was concluded, there was, strictly speaking, no link between that as-
pect of the entrepreneur’s activity and the actual contract. The crux of the matter was, therefore, 
whether a restrictive causality requirement applied, or else whether the mere co-existence of two 
elements (with no causal link) was sufficient to engage the jurisdiction of the consumer’s domicile 
State in accordance with Article 17.1 (c) Brussels I Regulation. 
III. CJEU’s decision 
To cut the story short, the CJEU rejected a causation requirement. Since the consumer, as the 
weaker party in contracts with professional entrepreneurs, must be protected, he or she must 
not be exposed to difficulties in proving his or her case. ‘Difficulties’ includes having to prove 
causation where it might be disputed by the professional entrepreneur. Requiring proof of causa-
tion might dissuade consumers from suing in their domestic courts, ultimately weakening the 
protection provided by the above rules.11 
IV. Legal doctrine 
Strictly speaking, Article 17.1 (c) Brussels I Regulation requires only that the commercial activity 
was directed towards the consumer’s State and that the specific contract should fall within the 
scope of the business area of the commercial activity directed in this way. The wording of Arti-
cle 17.1 (c) Brussels I Regulation does not provide any basis for a causation requirement.  
                                                
11 Op cit No 10, para 25. 
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Nonetheless, a glance at the second part of the rule, which stipulates that the contract must fall 
within the business area of the activity directed at the consumer’s State, is enough to cause legit-
imate doubts as to whether an internal link between the direction of the activity and the conclu-
sion of the contract is unnecessary. It is difficult to conceive of scenarios in which the business 
area requirement retains an independent scope without there being a causal link between the 
marketing activity and the conclusion of the contract.12 The entrepreneur would have to have 
directed the marketing activity in his or her business area in the relevant sense, without the pur-
chase contract in this business area coming about through that marketing activity. As the interac-
tion of the two requirements cannot just serve to exclude the jurisdiction of the consumer’s dom-
icile in the hypothetical case of inventory being sold, a requirement of a link to the conclusion of 
the contract seems to be implied.13 
This interpretation also accords with the content of materials which authorise conclusions to be 
drawn on the concepts, values and aims underlying the rule; the ongoing criticism of Article 17.1 (c) 
Brussels I Regulation occasioned the Commission and the Council to make a joint declaration in 
2000 concerning Article 17.1 (c) Brussels I Regulation.14 This declaration emphasises that, in re-
spect of the application of Article 17.1 (c) Brussels I Regulation, ‘it is not sufficient for an undertak-
ing to target its activities at the Member State of the consumer's residence […] a contract must 
also be concluded within the framework [sic!] of its activities.’ It is questionable whether such a dec-
laration can be relied on in itself, given its uncertain legal status and lack of normative authority. 
However, the declaration is not completely isolated from other, closely connected legislation, 
namely the Rome I Regulation.15 As mentioned above, Article 17.1 (c) Brussels I Regulation was 
adopted to determine the applicable law for consumer contracts in Article 6.1 Rome I Regulation. 
The joint declaration concerning Article 17.1 (c) Brussels Regulation is cited in detail in the Rome I 
Regulation, especially in respect of the need for the entrepreneur’s marketing activity to cause 
the contract to be concluded. This requirement is also added in Recital 25 Rome I Regulation.16 
According to that provision: 
  
                                                
12 Cf Nielsen in Magnus/Mankowski (eds), Brussels I Regulation (2007) Art 15 No 37. 
13 Cf F. Bydlinski, Methodenlehre2 (1991) 444: „Führte eine bestimmte Interpretation […] dazu, dass (die) Bestim-
mung […] zweck- und funktionslos wird, so ist diese Auslegung nicht anzunehmen.“ (‘If a certain interpretation 
would lead […] to the provision […] becoming purposeless and losing its function, then this interpretation should 
not be taken,’ translation provided by the authors). 
14 Joint declaration of the Council and the Commission on Articles 15 and 73 of Regulation No 44/2001, Annex II to the 
note of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union for the Permanent Representatives’ committee 
of 14. 12. 2000 in the corrected version of 20. 12. 2000, 14139/00 and 14139/00 COR2 (en)-JUSTCIV 137. 
15 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008, OJ L 2008/177, 6 et seqq. 
16 The background to Recital 25 Rome I Regulation is the so-called ‘El Corte Inglés’ case: ‘El Corte Inglés’ is a de-
partment store chain with a flagship store in Madrid and, inter alia, a branch in Lisbon. A Portuguese citizen, liv-
ing in Portugal, came to Madrid and went shopping there in the local ‘El Corte Inglès’. Since the overall enterprise 
El Corte Inglès also directs its commercial activity at Portugal, given the fact that a branch is located there, the 
application of Portuguese law was a possibility. In the course of the negotiations regarding Rome I Regulation, 
however, the Spanish delegation ultimately managed to exclude this possibility. Cf Mankowski, Muss zwischen 
ausgerichteter Tätigkeit und konkretem Vertrag bei Art. 15 Abs. 1 lit. C EuGVVO ein Zusammenhang bestehen? 
IPRax 2008, 333 (337). 
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‘[…] consumers should be protected by such rules of the country of their habitual residence […] 
provided that the consumer contract has been concluded as a result of the professional pursuing 
his commercial or professional activities in that particular country. The same protection should be 
guaranteed if the professional, while not pursuing his commercial or professional activities in the 
country where the consumer has his habitual residence, directs his activities by any means to that 
country or to several countries, including that country, and the contract is concluded as a result of 
such activities.’ 
Thus the Rome I Regulation establishes that the specific contract at issue must be the result of 
the targeted activity.  
Finally, it must be established whether Recital 24 Rome I Regulation (with the quotation from the 
joint declaration) and Recital 25 Rome I Regulation (requirement of a causal link) must be consid-
ered when interpreting the Brussels I Regulation. Recital 7 Rome I Regulation provides support 
for this idea, since it stipulates that the Rome I Regulation must be interpreted consistently with 
the Brussels I Regulation, and thus requires that the two Regulations be applied harmoniously. 
Since Recital 7 Rome I Regulation is intended to tie the more recent Regulation to the older one 
(i.e., it aims to produce coherence), it seems to be satisfied; no divergence of aims between the 
Brussels I and Rome I Regulations is identifiable in this area. The interpretation of Article 17.1 (c) 
Brussels I Regulation already mentioned at the beginning points in the same direction as Recital 25 
Rome I Regulation. The only remaining question in respect of the transferability of a Recital from 
one piece of legislation – and a more recent one at that – to the interpretation of an older regula-
tion was answered by the CJEU in C-463/06 FBTO Schadeverzoekeringen/Oderbreit17 apropos the 
Brussels I Regulation. Specifically, the issue was whether Article 13 Brussels I Regulation should 
be construed in light of Recital 16a of the Fourth Motor Insurance Directive of 2000, which was 
only introduced in 2005 by Article 5 Fifth Motor Insurance Directive. The CJEU did not hesitate in 
that case to assume (incorrectly on the particular facts, in the opinion of the authors of this 
text)18 that this was a correct and authentic reproduction of the historical legislative ambit.  
In consequence, we can note the following. Both the interpretation which preserves an inde-
pendent scope for the requirement that the contract be within the business area of the targeted 
activity and the joint declaration of the Commission and the Council in this respect – which is 
unambiguous and is quoted in Recital 24 Rome I Regulation and also Recital 25 of the Rome I 
Regulation (the latter two being relevant on the basis of Recital 7 Rome I Regulation and the FBTO 
Schadeverzekeringen case) – strongly support imposing a requirement of a causal link between the 
directed activity and the consumer’s conclusion of the contract.  
V. Legal politics 
Traditionally, European consumer protection in international procedural and private law has 
been directed towards the passive consumer. ‘Passive’ in this context means that the consumer is 
not the initiator of the international contract. The passive consumer principally limits his or her 
demand for goods to his or her home country, and is one who has no intention to enter the in-
                                                
17 CJEU 13. 12. 2007, C-463/06, FBTO Schadeverzekeringen/Odenbreit. 
18 Likewise Fuchs, Gerichtsstand für die Direktklage am Wohnsitz des Verkehrsunfallopfers? IPRax 2007, 302; Heiss, 
Die Direktklage vor dem EuGH: 6 Antithesen zu BGH 29. 9. 2006 (VI ZR 200/05), VersR 2007, 327; Thiede/Lud-
wichowska, EuGH, 13. 12. 2007, C 463/06, FBTO Schadeverzekeringen NV v Jack Odenbreit, VersR 2008, 631; Witt-
wer, Direktklage im Inland gegen ausländische Kfz-Haftpflichtversicherung, ZVR 2006, 404 (406). 
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ternational market. A foreign trader, however, pursues the consumer in his or her home country 
with advertising activities and induces him or her to conclude a contract. The consumer thus 
becomes a party to an international contract because he or she is the target of the commercial 
activities of a foreign trader, and not because of his or her own desire to trade internationally. 
The counterpart to the passive consumer is the active consumer, who takes the initiative to enter 
the international market, for example by travelling to a foreign country in order to conclude a 
contract with a foreign trader.19 
The traditional focus of international consumer protection on the passive consumer was obvious 
in the Rome20 and Brussels Conventions.21 Article 13 Brussels Convention and Article 5 Rome 
Convention required that the consumer had taken all the steps necessary in his or her country on 
his or her part for the conclusion of the contract, and that these steps were preceded by an entre-
preneur’s specific invitation or advertisement.22 The active and mobile consumer, who travels to a 
foreign country and then enters into the contract, was subject to these provisions only if the 
journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to contract.23 
In contrast, Article 6 Rome I Regulation and Article 17 Brussels I Regulation also apply to active 
consumers insofar as their applicability does not depend on the location where the contract was 
concluded.24 It is irrelevant whether the contract was concluded in the consumer’s home country, 
the entrepreneur’s,25 or even in a third country. If the entrepreneur pursues commercial activities 
in the consumer’s country, or directs such activities to that country, then the link to the consumer’s 
country is considered strong enough to subject the entrepreneur to its jurisdiction and its law.26  
In comparison to the previous rules of the Rome Convention and the Brussels Convention, Article 6 
Rome I Regulation and Article 15 Brussels I Regulation are thus considered a compromise be-
tween the active and passive consumer27 and an extension of the ‘semi-passive’28 consumer. As 
the following analysis will show, the Emrek/Sabranovic decision pushes this extension further.29 
The traditional restriction of consumer protection to passive consumers on the one hand, and 
the partial expansion to active consumers on the other, correspond to different goals of Europe-
an consumer law. European consumer law aims not only to improve consumer protection in the 
                                                
19 Cf Ragno, The Law Applicable to Consumer Contracts unter the Rome I Regulation, in Ferrari/Leible (eds), Rome I 
Regulation: The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe (2009) 129 (144 et seqq). 
20 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 19 June 1980; regarding its focus on passive con-
sumers see Reich/Halfmeier, Electronic Commerce: Consumer Protection in the Global Village, Dick. L. Rev 2001, 
112 (117 et seq): ‘The passive consumer is the beloved child of private international law who needs to be cuddled 
and protected, while the active consumer – whether an ocasional surfer or an Internet addict – opts out of his or 
her home jurisdiction by choice and, therefore, may be subjected to whatever law the supplier proposes, even 
offshore jurisdiction.’ 
21 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters of 27 September 
1968. 
22 Art 5.2 Rome Convention, Art 13.3 lit a and b Brussels Convention. 
23 Art 5.2, second indent Rome Convention. 
24 Cf Ragno in Ferrari/Leible 144 et seqq; Staudinger in Rauscher (ed), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollissionsrecht: 
EuZPR/EuIPR (2011) Art 15 Brüssel I-VO No 11; Mankowski, IPRax 2008, 335; Schoibl, Vom Brüsseler Übereinkom-
men zur Brüssel-I-Verordnung: Neuerungen im europäischen Zivilprozessrecht, JBl 2003, 149 (160 et seq). 
25  See for example CJEU 6. 9. 2012, C-190/11, Mühlleitner/Yusufi and Yusufi. 
26 Art 15.1 lit c Brussels I Regulation; Art 6.1 Rome I Regulation; cf Staudinger in Rauscher, Art 5 Brüssel I-VO No 11. 
27 Ragno in Ferrari/Leible 145 et seq. 
28 Mankowski, IPRax 2008, 338. 
29 According to Rühl, Kausalität zwischen ausgerichteter Tätigkeit und Vertragsschluss: Neues zum situativen An-
wendungsbereich der Art. 15 ff. EuGVVO, IPRax 2014, 41 (41, 43 et seq), this interpretation goes beyond the law 
and the intention of the legislator.  
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Member States, but also to establish and promote the internal market. This aim is to be realised 
by creating equal competition conditions for companies, and by making it easier for consumers 
to operate actively in other EU states without running the risk of being subject to foreign jurisdic-
tion and law.30 Consumers should thus be motivated to participate (actively) in the internal mar-
ket. Some authors have recently stated that, although the main, traditional goal of consumer law 
was the protection of the weaker party for social reasons, the aim at present is increasingly dom-
inated by the desire to strengthen the internal market. Accordingly, consumer confidence in the 
internal market should be increased in order to encourage those consumers to take advantage of 
the internal market and to buy consumer goods in other Member States.31 
This also extends to the question of jurisdiction. The ultimate objective in granting the consumer 
the right to litigate in his or her own jurisdiction is not to compensate unequal bargaining power, 
but rather to encourage certain socially desirable conduct: (active) participation in the internal 
market. Accordingly, in Emrek/Sabranovic the Advocate General32 explicitly indicated that the spe-
cial jurisdiction of Article 17 Brussels I Regulation serves as an incentive for consumers to con-
clude contracts in other Member States. The active consumer is thus not only an object of protec-
tion but the status principally encouraged in consumer law. This policy implies the assumption 
that people respond to such incentives, and that the law may serve as a powerful tool to encour-
age socially desirable conduct and discourage undesirable conduct. This assumption seems to be 
shared by parts of the so-called ‘behavioral law and economics’ movement,33 even though an 
empirical behavioral approach to law would imply checking the consumers’ reactions (or non-
reactions) to such legal incentives in real life (in order to verify or falsify the assumption).34 
The requirement of a definite link between the entrepreneur and the consumer’s home country 
fulfils different functions depending on whether consumer policy follows the traditional or the 
behavioural approach. Following the traditional approach, this link not only functions as a guaran-
tee of foreseeability for the entrepreneur, but also as a ‘lure’ which induces the consumer to con-
clude the contract. Following the behavioural approach, by contrast, it functions only as a means 
to make sure that the special jurisdiction is foreseeable by the entrepreneur. In accordance with 
Article 17.1 Brussels I Regulation, there is foreseeability if the entrepreneur pursues his commer-
cial activities in the consumer’s country or if he directs those activities to that country. 
In aiming to protect the passive consumer who has been pursued and lured by the entrepreneur, 
the traditional approach definitely requires a causal link. The consumer must have been caught 
in the net of the international contract not merely accidentally, but because of the trader’s target-
oriented advertising measures. On the other hand, by guaranteeing the consumer access to his 
                                                
30  Lurger/Augenhofer, Österreichisches und europäisches Konsumentenschutzrecht2 (2008) 12. 
31 Heiderhoff, Zum Verbraucherbegriff der EuGVVO und des LugÜ, IPRax 2005, 230 (231); Staudinger in Rauscher, Art 5 
Brüssel I-VO Art 15 Brüssel I-VO No 1. 
32 Advocate General 18. 7. 2013, C-218/12, Emrek/Sabranovic No 37. 
33 Korobkin/Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
California Law Review 2000, 1051 (1054); regarding the application of behavioural economics in consumer law cf 
Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, Minnesota Law Review 2008, 749; Rischkowsky/Döring, 
Consumer Policy in a Market Economy – Considerations from the Perspectives of the Economics of Information, 
the New Institutional Economics as well as Behavioural Economics, J Consum Policy 2008, 285; Tscherner, Can 
behavioral research advance information duties, boilerplate and withdrawal rights? Austrian Law Journal 2014, 
144 (144 et seqq). 
34  Lurger, Empiricism and Private Law: Behavioral Research as Part of a Legal-Empirical Governance Analysis and a 
Form of New Legal Realism, Austrian Law Journal 2014, 20 (25 et seqq). 
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or her own jurisdiction in order to motivate him or her to enter the internal market, the behav-
ioural approach does not necessarily require a causal link between the entrepreneur’s activities 
and the conclusion of the contract. The directed activity requirement does not function as a lure, 
but only as a guarantee of foreseeability for the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur directs com-
mercial activities to a certain country in order to acquire clients then it can be assumed that the 
jurisdiction and the law of that country do not come to him as a surprise.35 
This approach can already be seen when reading between the lines in the aforementioned deci-
sions Pammer/Reederei Schlüter and Alpenhof/Heller,36 as well as in Mühlleitner/Yusufi and Yusufi,37 
where the CJEU argued that the European Union legislature had removed the condition requiring 
the consumer to have taken the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract in his state, 
replacing it with “conditions applicable to the trader alone”.38 It is sufficient if the trader pursues 
his or her commercial activities in the consumer’s domicile, or by any means directs such activi-
ties to that Member State, and thus manifests his intention to establish commercial relations with 
the consumers who have their domicile there.39 
The Advocate General in Emrek/Sabranovic explicitly refers to this argument, confirms that the 
only conduct relevant to the special jurisdiction issue is the conduct of the entrepreneur, and 
denies that a causal link is required.40 Whether the directed activities and the concluded contract 
are connected is irrelevant because the entrepreneur will hardly be aware of it. Whether the 
special jurisdiction was foreseeable to him or her therefore has no influence on the criterion. This 
means that the special jurisdiction applies to all consumers, passive and active, whenever a foreign 
jurisdiction would not come as a surprise to the entrepreneur. 41 
VI. Conclusion 
From a doctrinal perspective, the above arguments clearly indicate that a causal link is a re-
quirement. It is somewhat surprising that none of the arguments raised received any mention in 
the Emrek/Sabranovic decision; the CJEU takes as its sole motivation the potential evidential diffi-
culties a consumer might face42. However, the CJEU cannot act to alleviate such difficulties for the 
consumer, since it does not have the relevant competence for the question of whether a non 
liquet can be held against the consumer. To be sure, this should be left to the European legislator 
to provide for the needs of the European consumers as it was done for victims of road traffic 
accidents in course of the Fifth Motor Insurance Directive.43 
                                                
35  Mankowski, IPRax 2008, 334. 
36  CJEU 7. 12. 2010, C-585/08, C-144/09, Pammer/Reederei Schlüter und Alpenhof/Heller. 
37  CJEU 7. 9. 2012, C-190/11, Mühlleitner/Ahmad Yusufi and Wadat Yusufi. 
38  CJEU 7. 12. 2010, C-585/08, C-144/09, Pammer/Reederei Schlüter und Alpenhof/Heller No 60; CJEU 7. 9. 2012,  
C-190/11, Mühlleitner/Ahmad Yusufi and Wadat Yusufi No 39. 
39  CJEU 7. 12. 2010, C-585/08, C-144/09, Pammer/Reederei Schlüter und Alpenhof/Heller No 60; CJEU 7. 9. 2012,  
C-190/11, Mühlleitner/Ahmad Yusufi and Wadat Yusufi. 
40  Advocate General 18. 7. 2013, C-218/12, Emrek/Sabranovic No 17. 
41  Cf Advocate General 18. 7. 2013, C-218/12, Emrek/Sabranovic No 20 und 38; Advocate General 18. 5. 2010,  
C-588/08 and C-144/09, Pammer/Reederei Schlüter und Alpenhof/Heller No 64. 
42 CJEU 17. 10. 2013, C-218/12, Lokman Emrek/Vlado Sabranovic (not published) No 25. 
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With regard to the traditional purpose behind special jurisdiction for consumer contracts (the 
protection of the consumer who has been induced by the entrepreneur to enter into the con-
tract), the CJEU’s position is untenable; a consumer who concludes a contract abroad for reasons 
other than the entrepreneur’s directed activity is simply not covered by the rule. In the absence 
of such coverage, he or she is not entitled to the jurisdiction of his or her home courts.  
The CJEU reveals a single-minded focus on European consumers neglecting tenable interests of 
entrepreneurs, notably those of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises): not all entrepre-
neurs have sophisticated means to defend themselves in fori all over Europe. Must now even 
smallest Bed & Breakfast abstain from accommodating foreign guests just because it provides a 
website in a foreign language (which, we may add, had no influence on choosing this B&B in the 
first place)? 
Without more, the Emrek/Sabranovic decision reflects a shift in consumer policy, which replaces 
the traditional stance of protecting the passive consumer with the aim of creating an active con-
sumer. In this context, the special jurisdiction functions as an incentive to encourage the consumer 
to enter contracts with entrepreneurs in other Member States and, simultaneously, strengthens 
the internal market. Thus, the consumer who (whether physically or virtually through the inter-
net) travels to another Member State and enters into a contract will be granted the right to pro-
ceed in his home jurisdiction whenever the special jurisdiction is foreseeable for the entrepreneur. 
In accordance with this policy, consumer law does not primarily aim to balance the interests of 
the consumer against those of the entrepreneur with regard to unequal bargaining power and 
social justice, but rather to provide incentives to encourage certain consumer conduct with the 
intention of strengthening the internal market. Whether this approach favours consumers or 
entrepreneurs in the long-term, and whether it actually strengthens the internal market, remains 
to be seen. 
